Introduction
In this day and age of networked computers and the Internet, any effort to understand commons and culture needs some attention to what is happening in the digital world, and in particular, collaboration over the Internet. In this paper, I report some of our findings from a five-year empirical study of open source software commons.
In his seminal work The Wealth of Networks, Benkler coined the phrase "commonsbased peer-production" (2006, 63) to describe situations where no centralization exists, no hierarchical assignments occur, and individuals self-select what to work on. In the best of circumstances, large numbers of individuals, working over the Internet, search for the right project to contribute to (Benkler 2005, 178) . One of the key incentives driving this search, according to Eric von Hippel (2005a, b) , is user-driven need.
This idea of people searching the Internet for activities that interest them and that they might be able to contribute to extends to a variety of digital commons situations (consider the phenomenon of people contributing to Wikipedia entries, for example), it is not at all a stretch to argue that computer programmers were probably the first community to do this. After all, in the earliest days of computing right up to about 1980, it was standard practice in the academic and computer industry to share and collaborate on software code (Cambell-Kelly, 2003) . This practice continued as Internet infrastructure was being built and up until around 1980 when an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976 treated software code and their corresponding binary distributions as trade secrets (Schwarz and Takhteyev, 2009 ). This privatization of software, as many in this conference know, led to the free/libre and open source software "movement," initiated by Richard Stallman and colleagues in the 1980s and the brilliant use of copyright law to create software licenses that promoting sharing and collaboration -an approach referred to as Copyleft (FSF, 2009 ). Benkler (2006: 63) Wikipedia. But this idea has expanded into other collaborative areas of writing, such as in the area of course curriculum (e.g., Rice Connexions, MIT Open Courseware) and in many areas where digital products can be shared and remixed (see CreativeCommons.org for many examples). Moreover, peer-production commons experiments have appeared in some surprising new areas. Consider, for example, the use of this production model in national intelligence gathering (Howard, 2010) or the borrowing of open source production and crowdsourcing to spur design innovation and efforts to produce "openly designed physical (not digital) products, sometimes in an effort to solve market failure problems.
1 My particular interest in understanding open source peer-production motivation is to see how these collaborative principles might be applied to encourage sharing and dialog between public sector academics and practitioners (see Schweik, et al., 2011) or in efforts to solve problems faced across the world in environmental management (see Schweik, Evans and Grove, 2005) .
Given that the open source collaborative paradigm was born in the context of computer programming, and that it is in this space that it has been around the longest, it (Ostrom, 2005; Hess and Ostrom, 2007) . Ultimately, more than 40 hypotheses and research questions were identified, each of which we later investigated empirically 2 In this paper "open source commons" and "open source projects" are used interchangeably. (Schweik and English, forthcoming) . Figure 1provides a quick summary of some of the variables we researched, organized following the structure of the guiding theoretical Institutional Analysis framework (see Hess and Ostrom, 2007) . property. This "gift culture" (Raymond, 2000) was a particular puzzle to economists and, over time, the motivations driving these contributions became better understood (e.g., self learning, user centered need, self promotion, contributing to a movement, and being part of a community) (David and Shapiro, 2008; Schweik and English, forthcoming Krishamurthy, 2005; Riehle, 2007; and Deek and McHugh, 2007: 272-279 for more detail) . Governments embraced open source in efforts to break the vendor lock-in problem and, in some cases, to jump-start their own country's software industry (Simon, 2005; Lewis 2010 ). Not-for-profit organizations became active in this space both in their own efforts to cut information technology costs and also in some instances to promote and help open source projects operate through overarching foundations (McQuillan, 2003; NOSI, 2008) . Scientific and academic organizations continued, in some cases as they always had, to share and collaborate on software code, but in sometimes new areas in an effort to move their own IT needs forward (see Courant and Griffiths, 2006 First, in this work we focused on the longitudinal aspects of these commons and identified two key stages in their evolution. As we see it, open source commons go through an "Initiation Stage" where they start up and have yet to produce a first public release, and a "Growth Stage" capturing the period after a first public release of code.
We hypothesized that the factors affecting collaborative success and abandonment would be different in these two stages.
Second, with these stages identified, we set out to develop solid metrics for collaborative success and abandonment in each of these stages. The measures are conservative in that they see both projects that grow and gain large development teams and ones that begin and remain as very small collaborations (even 1 developer and a small community of users) as collaborative success stories. Our measures build on project "life and death metrics" (Robles-Martinez and colleagues, 2003) as well as "project popularity metrics" (Weiss, 2005) . sentence, we carefully categorized each project in these datasets based on our definitions of success and abandonment (Table 1) and with the dependent variable in place, we analyzed and investigated the importance of theoretically identified independent variables using contingency tables, classification and regression tree and logit regression. But rather than present statistical results, we will simply extract a few findings we think are important for discussion at the cultural commons workshop.
Datasets/Methods

As
*** Table 1 Projects that are successful in this stage -meaning they continue to be worked on -are ones where project leaders who devote larger numbers of hours to the project. In addition, putting in place plans for architecture and functionality, project goals, and project documentation as well as a good project web presence appears to be important, for it helps get contributions from volunteers or potential end-users before the first release. We found that "putting in the hours" and various elements of leadership are not simply correlated with success but appear to be causes of success in the Initiation stage.
In the Growth or post-first release stage, the story seems to be that once a project has achieved a first release then the leadership abilities of members of the development team, coupled with the utility of the software itself, begins to attract new users and eventually, at least one new development team member or other "community"
contributors. Developers continue to make contributions to the software leading to a virtuous circle of continuing improvements and continued collaborative success. In this stage, we found that aspects of project leadership, slight growth in the development team and project financing are causal influences for success. In our analysis of the quantitative data, we had several hypotheses that were related to the emergence of the more complex ecosystem (Figure 2 ). Our SF dataset had nearly 50 categorical variables that classified each project in some form. For example, project administrators could identify which operating system it was built for. Or they could classify the project along a large set of "software types" (e.g., databases, end user desktop applications, etc.). Our expectation was that if open source was still being motivated by the more philosophical open source or "free/libre movement," we'd expect to find projects aligned with this movement to be more successful in Initiation and Growth compared to projects not aligned with this movement. In other words, contingency tables would show statistically significant distributional differences for these variables between successful and abandoned projects.
In our data analysis of our 1400 surveyed projects (Schweik and English, forthcoming), we found no evidence suggesting that projects affiliated with more "pure open source" were more successful compared to projects that did not have this affiliation. We also found no distributional differences between projects licensed with the Taken together, what these findings suggest is that SF, perhaps coupled with search engines like Google, act as a "power law hub" (Karpf, 2010) allowing people with similar interests, passions and skills to connect with each other and begin to feel each other out as potential collaborators, and eventually joining in co-production together. In the SF case this is largely multi-continental collaborations between North America and Europe.
I have not seen statistical evidence anywhere else that suggests this is happening but this appears to be important in open source and I think this is a very important finding and something that is happening in other digital commons situations (e.g., Wikipedia). In 
In his famous essay on open source The Cathedral and the Baazar (2001), Eric
Raymond argued potential contributors to open source software commons will be less apt to participate if the "number of hoops" they have to deal with is higher. In other words, more formalized rules guiding the process of contributing code will reduce the likelihood of participation. Programmers want to program, not deal with rules guiding collaboration. In our research, we found strong statistical and qualitative evidence suggesting that this is indeed the case, and this is one area that differs quite sharply from more traditional environmental commons I have studied in the past. In most of the SF projects we surveyed, the operational rules are "very informal" social norms. What operational rules that do exist are often embedded in the online collaborative system used to coordinate work (e.g., CVS or Subversion). Moreover, we found that in the SF survey data the dominant governance model was a "benevolent dictator" rather than a model with more democratic processes.
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This all said, we did also see some indication -as we expected -that institutions evolve and become more formalized as projects grow in terms of developers. However, in our survey data, this tended to be more along the lines of "we moved from a very informal institutional structure to simply an informal structure," that is, the "very" descriptor was removed. But it did suggest that institutions do evolve toward some level of formalization.
What this tells us
Two conclusions come out of the discussion above that are important for where we are headed in this paper. way, weighted toward smaller development projects. This is true because the population we studied, SF, is vastly dominated by projects driven by very small development teams and a majority that is only one developer. But even in cases of 1-developer teams, the software is still a form of commons (more accurately a common-property regime, see Schweik and English, forthcoming) , and can still involve collective action between the developer and a user community. However, what we didn't do in our data analysis -and what should be done -is an examination of the larger developer team projects that 5 We think this finding was so strong because we were trying to understand the population of open source and so many of the projects in our dataset were small development team projects. reside in the longer tail in Figure 3 . In our 2006 data, the largest project was on the order of 320 developers, but it was only one of 107,747 in our dataset. Still (while at the time of this writing I don't have the actual number) I estimate that there are several thousand projects in these SF data that have a developer team of ten people or more.
The institutional design of these projects is likely different than the vast majority of others in SF, and their attributes are drowned out in our statistical analysis because they represent such a small proportion of the population.
Second, in our analysis, we have found evidence that the governance of projects do indeed evolve. This is important to understand better, in particular for larger projects that involve participants from a variety of organizations. We selected the Open Source Geospatial Foundation and seven of its associated projects for study. We chose this case because it provided an example of a more complex open source ecosystem given nonprofits and private firms are involved, and its international scope was an added benefit. A practical reason for choosing this case is that I am involved with this foundation, currently acting as the chair of its education and curriculum group. This participation, I think, gave me more credibility as we moved ahead to interview developers in OSGeo-related projects.
Full descriptions of the analysis of the OSGeo case can be found at Schweik and Kitsing (2010) and Schweik and English, forthcoming (chapters 5 and 6). For our interests here, my goal is to briefly describe my experience using IAD as a guiding framework for institutional analysis, coupled with Ostrom's seven categories of rules (Ostrom, 2005) .
A primer on the three institutional levels of IAD and Ostrom's seven rule classes
Summarizing what is more fully described in Ostrom (2005) , within the "institutional attributes" component of the IAD framework are three nested institutional levels: operational, collective-choice and constitutional.
The operational level is a general label to describe the general sets of rules (formal or informal) that influence the daily behavior and actions of commons participants. For example, in an open source software setting, these can be rules established for how computer code gets accepted into the next version of the software being developed or the process for releasing a new version.
The collective-choice level involves a different set of rules that (a) define who is eligible to undertake operational-level activities and (b) defines who has authority to change operational-level rules and the procedures for how these changes come about.
An example of a collective-choice rule in the context of open source software commons would be a change in the process of how code is committed to the repository, or a change in how code is reviewed prior to adding to a new release library.
Finally constitutional level rules specify how the commons is structured or organized constitutionally, but, in addition include specifications on who can change collectivechoice arrangements and also the procedure for how those changes can be made. In open source software commons, an obvious constitutional issue is the choice of license to attach to the software (e.g., a GPL or non-GPL type license). But it can also be related to whether the project is associated with a non-profit foundation or whether there are particular requirements related to an oversight board, etc.
These three levels of rules in IAD have been guiding commons researchers for at least two decades, particularly in the context of natural resource commons. But what was lacking in case analysis was more specificity on how to articulate rules that exist in any of these levels. In her book Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005), Elinor Ostrom tried to add more clarity by proposing seven classes of rules that can exist in any of these three levels, summarized in Table 3 . *** Table 3 about here ***
The OSGeo Case
OSGeo is a nonprofit foundation that provides overarching support to a number of open source software projects working in the area of geographic information systems.
Broadly speaking, these are technologies that, in some fashion, deal with data that has positional ties to the earth. OSGeo's mission is to "support the development of opensource geospatial software, and promote its widespread use" (OSGeo 2009). At the time of our research there were ten software projects treated as "full members" with the foundation, and several others in "incubation." We chose to study only fully affiliated projects because their institutional designs would be fully formed. We contacted representatives of all ten projects for interviews, but only seven were willing to participate in the study. Here, we only report some of the findings related to institutional design and structure.
Institutional analysis of this case requires not only attention to the three levels and classes of rules that Ostrom presents, but also a realization that there is an institutional design at the foundation level, and then also institutional designs for each project.
Moreover, there are mandates established by the foundation that each project must comply with.
At the foundation level, we found examples of Ostrom's rule classes, some of which are summarized in Table 4 . *** Table 4 about here *** At the project level, our interviews and interpretation of online documentation led us to a characterization of rules at this level as well (Table 5 ). *** Table 5 In another section of our book-length study (Schweik and English, forthcoming, Chapter 5, Table 5 .4), I was able to take the description of the evolution of institutions in the Debian Linux case articulated by O'Mahony and Ferrarro (2007) and associate key rules described to Ostrom's seven rule classes. In their paper, O'Mahony and Ferrarro describe the evolution of governance structures in this high profile open source software project, and we were able to articulate in a two-column table the various seven rule classes described at different institutional levels (constitutional, collective-choice, or operational) for two longitudinal stages. (For space reasons I decided not to include this table in this paper). The important point to be made is that it is possible to do this.
Conclusions and Future Research
The take home message is that the OSGeo case study experience has convinced Increasingly there is a need to understand the structure of institutional designs in these larger, more complex commons, and a need to understand how they evolve. Our empirical work on SF projects revealed some evidence that formalized institutions do emerge as projects get larger, but our findings along these lines are limited because of the large number of small projects in our SF dataset.
The question this leads me to is how to best analyze institutional structure and its evolution in a comparative fashion? We need methods for systematically articulating these structures and Ostrom's IAD levels (operational, collective-choice, constitutional) coupled with her seven rule categories provides an initial framework to do this. Our work provides an existence proof that this is possible. However, I've found that even with these common classification schemes, comparative analysis in table format between cases or across time periods is still difficult. 
